Welcome!

I am a PhD Candidate in Economics from Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

My main research topics are Behavioural Economics, Microeconomic Theory and Experimental Methods. Using theory and experiments, I investigate how perceived responsibility for negative externalities affects decision-making.

I am on the 2026–2027 Job Market

Working Papers

Perceived Responsibility for Negative Externalities

Job Market Paper

Abstract

Why do some individuals pay to offset their own emissions but not the same emissions caused by someone else? I study how previously caused harm and anticipated outcomes shape the perception of responsibility for negative externalities, and how that perception affects decision-making. In a theoretical framework, a decision maker can repair personally caused harm and exogenous background harm of unknown origin. Beyond outcome-based preferences, she cares about maintaining a moral self-image that is activated by backward-looking responsibility. Under certain conditions, a desire to restore that moral self-image overrides efficiency or equity concerns, leading the decision maker to repair exclusively personally caused harm while ignoring background harm. Based on this behavioural prediction, I propose a sharp revealed preference test that isolates responsibility-based preferences from outcome-based preferences. This informs the design of an online experiment in which I vary the causal history of harm, the price to repair personally caused harm, and the price to repair background harm. Structural estimation of preferences reveals considerable heterogeneity in the influence of perceived responsibility on behaviour both at the individual and aggregate level. Overall, subjects exhibit a responsibility premium of 29\%--48\% when paying to repair personally caused harm. These results have important implications for the limits of individual responsibility in consumer markets, the demand for voluntary carbon offsets, and the efficiency of CSR activities.

Monopoly Screening of Environmentally Conscious Consumers with Voluntary Carbon Offsets

Abstract

I characterize market equilibria in which the seller has access to an offsetting technology to mitigate the pollution generated by the consumption and production of the core product it sells. In contrast to an intrinsic environmental quality, offsets allow consumers to pay to reduce the pollution emitted by the core product sold to \textit{other} consumers, independently of their own consumption. How a monopolistic seller employs these offsets in equilibrium depends on the nature of the environmental preferences of conscious consumers. Under responsibility-based preferences -- where consumers care exclusively about the net pollution of their own consumption good -- the seller maintains high demand and profits by offering no offsets to selfish consumers and full offsets for the pollution generated by the core product sold to environmentally conscious consumers. Because pollution from selfish consumers' consumption remains unmitigated, this market outcome is inefficient. A benevolent social planner corrects this inefficiency by setting a carbon tax, which works as a mandatory offset of emissions for all core products. In contrast, under outcome-based preferences -- where consumers care about the total pollution emitted in the market -- a seller benefits by adding cross-offsets to the bundle of the most environmentally concerned consumers which reduce the pollution emitted by the core products sold to selfish consumers. Only under outcome-based preferences can the market achieve net-zero pollution. Moreover, only under outcome-based preferences does an equilibrium exist in which the seller runs a dual business: selling the dirty core product to selfish consumers and only cross-offsets to the most environmentally concerned consumers.

References

Teaching Experience

  • Barcelona School of Economics (Graduate)
    • Industrial Organization (Spring 2024):
      TA for Sandro Shelegia
    • Master Projects (2023-2026):
      TA for Rodrigo Carril/Joan Monràs
  • Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Undergraduate)
    • Topics in Microeconomics (2023-2026):
      TA for Larbi Alaoui/Jose Apesteguia/Alexander Frug/Rosemarie Nagel/Sandro Shelegia
    • Information Economics (2023-2025):
      TA for Sandro Shelegia
    • Microeconomics I (Spring 2023):
      TA for Fabian Gaessler
    • Análisis de Datos (2023-2025):
      TA for Claudia Sanguinetti (Spanish)